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BANKS & BANKING-CHECKS-AccEPTANcE-REOCATONS.-BALDINGER
& KUPFERMAN MFG. Co. v. MANUFACTURERs'-CITIZEN TRUST Co., i56
N. Y. S. 445.-Where the drawer of a check stopped payment thereon,
and subsequently the bank through mistake certified check to the payee,
who deposited it in his bank, and the certifying bank refused payment on
presentment, held, the payee could not enforce payment by the bank,
since the drawer was still liable on the check, due to his stopping pay-
ment thereon, and the payee could therefore show no change of circum-
stances nor injury to himself.
Sect. 162 of the Negotiable Instrument Law provides: The acceptor
by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the
tenor of his acceptance. This crystallized the existing common law. The
leading English case in which it is enunciated is Price v. Neal, 3 Bur-
row 1354, decided by Lord Mansfield in 1762,-New York holding that
this applies only to a bona fide holder for value. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487; Halifax v. Lyle, 3 Exch. 446; Minot
v. Gibson, 3 Tenn. 481. The leading New York case analogous to the
principal case is Oddie v. The National City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735. It was
held that the bank became liable for the amount of the check, although
on the same day, and before the close of banking hours, but after it
had paid other checks of the drawer's presented later it returned the
check to depositor as not good, and although the account of the drawer
was overdrawn at the time of the deposit. The legal effect of that trans-
action was held to be precisely the same as though the money had been
first paid to the plaintiff, then deposited. Commercial Bank v. Hughes,
17 Wend. 97; Carroll v. Cone, 40 Barb. 222; Marsh v. Oneida Central
Bank, 34 Barb. 298. It was said in Oddie v. National City Bank that
the element of estoppel existed in that the bank kept the check from
two o'clock to three o'clock, thus depriving the payee of his opportunity
of demanding his money of the drawer. This is a doubtful basis of
estoppel. The doctrine of this case, Price v. Neal, has often been termed
atrocious. The principal case is more in harmony with justice in refusing
to let the payee recover from the bank unless he could show actual injury.
There is a possible narrow ground of distribution between Oddie v.
National City Bank and the principal case in that in the former the
drawer was insolvent and in the latter he was not.
G. S.
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-CONSIDERATION-MUTUALITY-RIGHTS OF
PARTIES.-BOWIE v. TROWBRIDGE (Ir RE OL's ESTATE), 156 N. W. (IowA)
977.-Where a man engaged to marry becomes afflicted. with disease
whereby the performance of marriage duties would aggravate his disease
and hasten his death, held, that either party to the contract may repu-
diate without being subjected to liability therefor, since the consideration
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for an agreement to marry is the giving and receiving by marriage all
that is implied in the relationship, entailing mutual obligations, for the
failure of which by the act of God either party may refuse to perform.
Salinger, J., and Evans, C. J., dissenting.
The older view of liability of either party for breach of promise
despite the fact of physical disability, finds expressiorf in the famous
English case of Hall v. Wright, El. BI. & El. 746, where the defendant
was held liable notwithstanding that after the promise, without his
default, he was afflicted with "bleeding at the lungs" whereby he was
rendered incapable of marrying without peril to his life. For an Amer-
ican case, see Smith v. Compton, 67 N. J. L. 548. Since the case of
Hall v. Wright, there has been a decided change in sentiment in England
and America. In Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91, the court, repudiating Hall
v. Wright, say that it proceeds on a theory as to the objects contemplated
by the marriage relation which is contrary to the general conception.
Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 69o, laid down the rule as to implied condi-
tion of continued health. See also Gardner v. Arnett, 21 Ky. L. Rep. I;
Shackleford v. Hamilton, 93 Ky. So; Grover v. Zook, 44 Wash. 489. It
is well settled that in contracts involving personal services, incapacity of
body or mind without default on the part of the performer is an excuse
for non-performance. Robinson v. Davison, L. R. 6 Ex. 269. With much
greater reason does this apply to contracts to marry which are by their
very nature peculiarly personal. Common understanding as well as public
policy demands that the continuance of health should be an implied condi-
tion of the contract. Conditions implied in law are no innovations upon
the law of contract as the dissenting judges seem to feel in this case.
Sound public policy is the basis for such implied conditions and there is
no need of legislative action to effectuate this. The decision in the
principal case is no doubt in consonance with the trend of modern cases
in this country.
B. P. S.
CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-CREATION OF THE RELATION-STANDARD OF
DuTY TOWARD INTENDED PASSENGERS.-MISHLER V. CHICAGO, ETC., Ry. Co.,
iii N. E. (IND.) 46o.-The plaintiff boarded defendant's street car while
it was running at the rate of 3 or 4 miles an hour. Due to the defective
condition of the track, the jolting of the car caused him to be thrown
off and injured. Held, the duty of the defendant, as to the risks incident
to a defective track, is to be treated as identical with its duty toward
a passenger generally; and this duty is owed alike to all persons in its
cars intending to become passengers thereon, regardless of the time and
place where they boarded the car. Ibach, 3., and Shea, 3., dissenting
(in iii N. E. (Ind.) 944).
The majority opinion contends that the carrier owes the highest degree
of practicable care, included in which was the duty of keeping its tracks
in repair, to all persons in its cars intending to become passengers; and
the mere fact that the contract for passage was not yet consummated by
collection of fare or an acceptance by the carrier will not relieve the
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latter from liability for injury resulting solely from the neglect of such
duty. The minority asserts that if the injured party were not a passenger,
the carrier would .owe him no duty to care for his safety in the highest
degree practicable. 6 Cyc. 536. If the plaintiff were a trespasser, defend-
ant would not be liable for negligence, in the absence of malevolence.
If he were a licensee, defendant would be liable only if it knew of the
defects. If he were an invitee, the company would be absolutely liable for
any injury due to their negligence. The case goes very far in holding him
an invitee. While it is true that the company invites the public impliedly,
still such invitation is open only at stopping places. Bricker v. Phila. R.
Co., 132 Pa. St. I; Farley v. Cincinnati R. Co., io8 Fed. 14. See also,
Eppendof v. Brooklyn R. Co., 69 N. Y. 195. If plaintiff were not a
passenger (as both opinions agree), nor a licensee, nor, it is submitted,
an invitee, under what duty does the defendant lie toward him? The
decision in reality amounts to holding plaintiff a passenger. It is sub-
mitted that such a decision goes to great lengths in practically holding
one a passenger who boards a car at a place, and in a manner,
unauthorized by the railway company. A. N. H.
CONTRAcTs-ANTIcIPATORY BRaAc-DENAL OF LIABILITY ON INSURANCE
POLIcY.-BoRGER v. CONN. FIRE INs. Co., 156 PAc. (CAL.) 7o.-The policy
issued by defendant allowed 9o days for payment in case of dispute as
to the extent of liability. Upon immediate denial by defendant of all
liability, plaintiff brought suit without waiting for the stipulated period
to elapse. Held, the suit was premature since such denial did not make
the sum due before the 9o days.
California is among the states that recognize the doctrine of anticipatory
breach of contract. Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537; Garberino v. Roberts, iog
Cal. 125, 128. Hence the reason adduced for the decision in the principal
case cannot be sustained, inasmuch as it applies equally to all examples of
anticipatory breach. Even in jurisdictions, however, which admit the
doctrine, a distinction has been sought to be drawn between bilateral and
unilateral contracts-especially those involving the payment of a sum of
money at a determinate future date, such as notes-on the ground that
in the latter the practical reason for allowing the plaintiff to act on the
advance repudiation, namely to determine his own conduct, does not
exist. Cf. Fuller, C. J., in Roehim v. Horst, 178 U. S. I, I8. On this
ground the principal case might well rest were it not for the fact that it
proves too much. There is a clear distinction between the effect of the
doctrine of anticipatory breach as (I) affording the injured party a
defence to further performance of his own obligation, in case of a bilateral
contract, and (2) giving him an immediate right of action for defendant's
breach, in either unilateral or bilateral contract. Pollock on Contracts
(Ed. Williston), 361. The above distinction should logically operate to
confine the injured party to his defensive remedy in any case, and in
both classes of contracts prevent him from bringing suit until the defend-
ant's obligation was due. But such is not the law. In fact, other states,
recognizing anticipatory breach, have not followed California but have
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granted an immediate right of action in situations like the principal case.
Reese v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 156 N. Y. Sup. 408; New Am-
sterdam Casualty Co. v. New Palestine Bank, io7 N. E. (Ind. App.)
554; Hansell-Elcock Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass
Ins. Co., 177 Ill. App. 500.
C. B.
CRIMINAL LAw-DISCLOSURE OF OFFENCE BY ILLEGAL SEARC.-TowN OF
BLACKSBURG V. BEAMA, 88 S. E. (S. C.) 44i.-Where a police officer forcibly
and unlawfully, without process, searched defendant's person and took
the key to his trunk, which he opened, finding therein whiskey which was
being transported to a non-licensed county, held, that defendant could
not be convicted of transporting alcoholic liquors, since a citizen may not
be arrested and have his person searched by force and without process
to secure testimony against him. Fraser, J., dissenting.
By the Constitution a person is secured against unreasonable searches
and seizures, Amendment IV; and giving evidence against himself,
Amendment V. These amendments refer to powers exercised by the
government of the United States and not to those of the individual
states, 6 R. C. L., Constitutional Law, ff 233. The security intended to
be guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent violations
of private security in person and property by federal officers acting under
legislative or judicial sanction. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383; Adams
v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585. The constitutional privilege of the Fifth Amend-
ment applies only to testimonial compulsion, and any form of process
treating defendant as a witness. Boyd v. U. S., 1n6 U. S. 616. Though
a search without legal justification is a trespass, and the officer liable,-
McClury v. Brenton, 123 Ia. 368, Regan v. Harkey, 40 Tex. Civ. App.
i6,-it is the general rule that evidence of a criminal offence obtained
by an illegal search of person or premises is admissible, and not a
violation of these constitutional guaranties. 8 R. C. L. Criminal Law,
i93; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IV, 111 2183, 2263-4; Shields v. State,
1O4 Ala. 35; Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457. Nor is it a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams v. State, ioo Ga. 511.
Nevertheless, the obiter expressions of opinion by the majority in Boyd
vi. U. S., supra, and refused generally by judicial opinion,--Hale v. Hen-
kel, 201 U. S. 43; State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12,--have led a few courts to
adopt its erroneous view and to exclude documents and chattels obtained
by illegal seizure. Hammock v. State, I Ga. App. X26; State v. Slamon,
73 Vt. 212; State v. Sheridan, 121 Ia. 164. The holding of the principal
case is contrary, to the weight of authority.
E. J. M.
CRIMINAL LAW-INsTRUCTIONS-EvIDENCE-PREVroUs GOOD CHARACMR.-
COMMONWEALTH: v. RONELLO, 96 ATI. (PA.) 826.-Held, where there was
evidence of defendant's previous good character, it was error to instruct
that if -the jury were satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty, this conclusion could not be over-
come by the character evidence.
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Good character evidence should be considered with all the other evi-
dence in the case, Allen v. State, 8 Ala. App. 228; People v. Dippold,
3o App. Div. (N. Y.) 62; but such evidence is not of itself sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt, Cobb v. State, 115 Ala. 18; Carzuile
v. State, 148 Ala. 576; Hammond v. State, 74 Miss. 214; and proof of
good character is of no weight if the jury are satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt from all the evidence that defendant is guilty. People v.
Dippold, supra; State v. McGrath, 35 Ore. iog; State v. Mapin, 196 Mo.
164; People v. Mitchell, 129 Cal. 584; Hayes v. U. S., 32 Fed. 662. An
Oklahoma court has even held that the defendant has no right to have
good character evidence considered at all in deciding the issue of reason-
able doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Coleman v. State, 118 Pac. (Okl.)
594; and Texas agrees that good character is not affirmative evidence
for defendant nor is it to be considered at all in determining his guilt.
McDaniel v. State, 139 S. W. (Tex.) 1154. On the other hand, it is
held in New Yoik that the good reputation of the accused may in itself
create a reasonable doubt where none would otherwise exist. People v.
Buccufurri, 143 N. Y. Sup. 62; People v. Koppman, 143 N. Y. Sup. gig.
Alabama adds that good reputation, when taken with all the evidence in
the case, may raise such a doubt as to authorize acquittal when the jury
otherwise would have no doubt. Watts v. State, 59 So. (Ala.) 270;
McCullough v. State, ii Ga. App. 612. The principal case seems to take
the New York view that good character alone may create a doubt sufficient
for an acquittal where the evidence of the defendant's guilt is otherwise
convincing. This doctrine seems to lay rather too much stress on
evidence of defendant's previous good reputation. S. B.
HoMIClDE-JUSTIFICATION.-COOP V. STATE, 180 S. W. (TEx.) 254-
Wife of appellant had conducted herself in such way as to show that she
had been unfaithful to marriage vows. Appellant saw his wife and
decedent standing in the street in close embrace and fired on them, killing
both. A Texas statute provides "Homicide is justifiable when committed
by husband upon the person of anyone taken in the act of adultery
with the wife,' provided the killing take place before the parties to the
act of adultery have separated." Held, appellant entitled to a charge that
he did not violate the law in killing his wife.
It seems to be settled in Texas under this statute that the killing of
the wife is justifiable wherever the killing of the other party would be.
Williams v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 480. The theory seems to be that since
at common law the killing of the wife under such circumstances was
manslaughter instead of murder, the statute may also be construed as
putting the killing of the wife on the same plane with the killing of the
other party. The Texas courts have given a broad construction to this
statute. In Morrison v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 519, it was held that the
statute contemplated only that the parties still be in the company of each
other. In Price v. State, iS Tex. App. 474, it is said that since at common
law it was not necessary that the guilty parties be taken in the act in
order to grade the homicide as manslaughter rather than as murder, so
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under the statute it is not necessary, to render the killing justifiable, that
they be taken in the act. If the facts would constitute manslaughter at
common law, under the Texas statute the killing would be justifiable. But
when the rule of construction of penal statutes is borne in mind, that
they are to be strictly construed, Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Blockes, 48
Tex. Civ. App. IO, it is hard to sustain the holding that under these
facts, the appellant was entitled to a charge that he did not violate
the law.
R. C. W.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO THIRD PARTIEs-NATuRE
OF THE GOODS As TEST.-MACPHERSON V. BUICK MOTOR Co., IIi N. E.
(N. Y.) 1o5o.-Plaintiff, owner of an automobile purchased from a retail
dealer, was thrown out and injured by the collapse of a defective wheel.
The complete machine had been assembled by and sent out from defend-
ant as manufacturer, though the wheel itself had been bought from
another manufacturer. Held, that a manufacturer of automobiles is
liable to third parties, not in contract relation with him, for injuries due
to negligent defects in construction, and that he is responsible for the
finished product although parts may have been bought from a reputable
manufacturer.
The manufacturer and seller of articles of ordinary use, in themselves
harmless, is not liable to those not in contract relations with him for
personal injuries due to negligence in construction of the article. Thorn-
hill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., loS N. E. (Mass.) 474. But the maker of
a thing imminently dangerous to life or health owes a positive duty of
care, commensurate with the peril, to every person into whose hands it
may lawfully come, or by whom it may lawfully be used. Wood v. Sloat
148 P. (N. M.) 507. Within this class there is a tendency to include not
only commodities whose very existence is fraught with danger to owner
and public-such as explosives, Mathis v. Granger Brick & Tile Co.,
149 Pac. (Wash.) 3; electricity, Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Searcy, 181
S. W. (Ky.) 662; gas, Sharlsey v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 144 Pac.
(Or.) 1152; volatile petroleum products, Standard Oil Co. v. Wakefield,
63 Fed. 400, etc.,-but also those whose normal use would result, with
reasonable certainty, in personal harm to the user, if not properly made.
Thus, food, Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 144 Pac. (Kan.) 202; bottled
drinks, Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 177 S. W. (Tenn.) 80; drugs,
Maxetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622; and soap, Hasbrouck v. Armour
& Co., 139 Wis. 357, have been held to be of this nature. In regard to
vehicles there has been a distinct and confessed conflict. The English
view, that they are not of this essentially and imminently dangerous
class, set forth in Winterbottom v. Wright, IO Meeson & Welsby iog,
quoted in the principal case, has been followed in this country as regards
carriages, Burkett v. Studebaker Mfg. Co., I5o S. W. (Tenn.) 421, and
by the federal court in the case of automobiles. Cadillac Motor Car Co.
v. Johnson, 221 Fed. (U. S. C. C. A.) 8ol. On the other hand, at least
two decisions have recognized the public policy of holding to strict
accountability the man who puts out an instrumentality of high speed
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transportation upon whose soundness will almost certainly depend many
lives. Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616; Quackenbush v.
Ford Motor Co., 153 N. Y. S. 131. Certainly as a question of fact it is
not difficult to see that there is a vital distinction between the horse-drawn
vehicle, with its inevitable limitations of speed and capacity, and the
modern motor car whose reliability is daily being subjected to more and
more severe tests and, accordingly, whose potential danger is steadily
rising. The only conceivable objection is that raised by the minority
opinion, namely, that in view of its theoretical analogy to non-dangerous
articles, the law of the motor should be amended by statute rather than
by judicial interpretation.
C. B.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-NEGLIGENT DELAY IN DELrVERY-DAMAGES
FOR MENTAL ANGUISH.-LAWRENCE V. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., 88 S. E.
(N. C.) 226.-Because of negligent delay of defendant in delivering a
telegram to the plaintiff, a negro, he was thereby prevented from attend-
ing the funeral of a friend, a white man. Held, that mental anguish hav-
ing been shown, the plaintiff could recover compensatory damages.
Brown, J., dissenting.
At common law there can, as a general rule, be no recovery of compen-
satory damages for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical injury.
Connelly v. Western Union Tel.. Co., Ioo Va. 5I; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Skar,
126 Fed. 295; unless such mental suffering results from a willful or
malicious wrong of defendant. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748.
This general rule also applies to cases where, through the negligent
delay of defendant, the plaintiff has been prevented from being present
at the bedside before death or from attending the funeral of a close
relative. Davis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 46 W. Va. 4
8 ; Rowan v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 149 Fed. 55o. Several states follow the rule that for mental anguish
in such cases, the plaintiff can recover special damages only where such
were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. W. U. Tel. Co.
v. Hogue, 79 Ark. 33; W. U. Tel. Co., 87 Tex. 165. Other cases hold that
such damages may be recovered only where the telegraph company had
notice from the language of the message or othervise, that by 'reason of
its default or negligence such damage would likely ensue. Williams v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 136 N. C. 82; Clay v. W. U. Tel. Co., 78 S. C. 1O9.
Some states hold to the doctrine that recovery may be had if the rela-
tionship between the parties is close, such as husband and wife, parent
and child, brother and sister. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Benson, 159 Ala. 254;
W. U. Tel. Co. v. De Andrea, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 395. And in these cases
mental anguish is presumed. But if the family relationship is more
remote or by marriage only, then mental anguish must be proved, in the
jurisdictions allowing recovery for mental suffering alone. It is apparent
from the cases in jurisdictions following the minority rule, that the rela-
tion between the parties was that of blood or 'marriage relationship.
But in the principal case, that element is entirely disregarded, as one is
a negro and the other a white.
L. W. B.
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TORTS-EXPLoSIVEs-LIABILITY FOR BLASTING-BAsIs op LiBaLiTY.-WAT-
SON V. Mississippi RivER PowER Co., 156 N. W. (IowA) i88.-Held, that
an owner of realty may recover, irrespective of any negligence, for dam-
age caused by concussion or vibration from blasts in the bed of a river
during the construction of a dam by a private company under an authori-
zation by Congress.
By the well-established general rule of law the owner of realty may
recover for blasting regardless of negligence where there has been an
actual physical invasion of his 'property. Hay v. Cohoes, 2 N. Y. i59;
Munro v. Dredging Co., 84 Cal. 515; Scott v. May, 3 Md. 431;
McAndrews v. Collers, 42 N. J. L. i89. However, where the damage is due
to the force of a concussion or vibration, the courts are in sharp conflict:
some imposing liability without proof of negligence, Hickey v. McCabe,
30 R. I. 346; Fita Simmons v. Braun, 199 Ill. 390; Colton v. Onder-
donk, 69 Cal. 155; Gossett v. So. Ry. Co., 15j Tenn. 376; while others
require that negligence be definitely proved. Booth v. 'Term. Co., 14o
N. Y. 276; Simon v. Henry, 62 N. J. L. 486; Page v. Dempsey, 184 N. Y.
245. The courts following the New York view, due to public policy,
consider the use of explosives as necessary for the improvement of land,
but draw a distinction between a use which is temporary, and one which
is permanent, as the latter would become a nuisance thus excluding it
from the operation of the rule applicable to the former. So it is held
that a reasonable use of explosives will not make one liable unless an
actual trespass is committed, although a neighbor may suffer damage if
negligence is absent. Simon v. Henry, supra; Booth v. Term. Co., supra.
The courts holding to the contrary view of absolute liability under all
circumstances draw no distinction between the damage resulting from an
invasion by a physical object and concussion or vibration as the blast
is considered the proximate cause of the injury in either case. Fitz
Simmons v. Braun, supra. The better reasoning seems to be with the
courts in accord with the principal case in which no distinction is drawn
between damage due to an actual invasion and concussion. The doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher has not been widely accepted in America, but its
probable application to this class of cases is due doubtless to the intrinsic
danger of blasting.
J. McD.
WITNES5ES-ComPErENcY-HUSBAND.--RAY v. WESTALL, 183 S. W.
(Mo.) 629.-Held, the husband of a beneficiary of a will who was not
himself a party to the action may give his nonexpert opinion that the
testatrix had capacity, it not appearing that his opinion was based on acts
of testatrix occurring in the presence of his wife; for if the will was
sustained, the legacy would pass to his wife as her separate property and
the husband could exercise no control over it.
Under the New York Code (Sec. 829) where a witness will gain or
lose by the judgment in the action, he is disqualified from testifying to
transactions with a decedent under whom a party to the action claims.
Franklin v. Kidd, 87 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 399. Thus, in a suit to decide
the validity of a will, the wife of a devisee who is made a defendant
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with her husband because of her contingent dower interest in land devised
to him is not competent to testify for the defendant to a conversation
with the testator. Johnson v. Cochrane, 159 N. Y. 555; Eckert v. Eckert,
13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 49o. But the husband is competent to testify in a
suit by the wife to impress a trust on realty though he would have ten-
ancy by curtesy in the land if wife's claim is sustained. Leary v. Corvin,
6o N. Y. Sup. 563; Spindler v. Gibson, 75 App. Div. (N. Y.) 444. And
the contingent interest of the husband of an executrix as tenant by
curtesy does not disqualify him as a witness. In re Percival's Estate,
79 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 567; Hungerford v. SNow, 129 App. Div. 816.
At common law, a husband was incompetent to testify in actions where
his wife was a party or had a direct pecuniary interest in the result of
the action and the Missouri court holds in another case, Norvell v. Cooper,
134 S. W. io95, that the husband remains incompetent to testify in such
cases except where a statute has removed his disqualification and hence
in this case in a suit against an administrator on a note of the intestate's
the husband of the intestate's heir was held incompetent to testify. And
in Texas, in a partition suit for land which a married woman claimed
by gift from a decedent, her husband was held an incompetent witness
on account of interest in spite of a statute giving married women control
over the rents from their separate realty. Tannehill v. Tannehill, 171
S. W. (Tex.) 1050.
In many cases, however, it is said that the interest sufficient to dis-
qualify a witness in such cases as these must be pecuniary, legal, certain
and immediate. Svensson v. Lindgren, 124 Minn. 386. By such a test
the principal case is clearly correct in considering the husband a competent
witness.
S. B.
